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Notes
Preserving Dignity in Due Process
Sara B. Tosdal*
Procedural due process is a guarantee of fairness. Fundamentally, this guarantee requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Procedural protections from arbitrary state action
vary according to the context of each case, and protections in administrative actions are
distinct from those provided in formal judicial proceedings. The administrative state
developed to address a pressing need: how to govern and regulate when the three
branches of government lack the capacity to efficiently and effectively administer an everevolving society. But as society has developed and expanded, individuals have more
frequently interacted with the administrative state, in turn necessitating the expansion of
procedural due process into an area of law that prioritizes efficiency over individual
rights.
Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have addressed
this tension, but with different emphases. Where the U.S. Supreme Court applies a narrow
constitutional threshold for rights implicating procedural protections, the California
Supreme Court applies a more expansive threshold, with a particular focus on the dignity
of the individual confronted with an adverse state action. Where the U.S. Supreme Court
uses a three-factor balancing test for procedural adequacy, the California Supreme Court
has articulated a four-factor balancing test that recognizes a person’s dignitary interest in
procedural protections against the state.
However, California’s due process analysis has been applied haphazardly, at best,
leading to confusion amongst appellate courts. This Note argues that uneven application
of the doctrine stems from unclear guidance from the California Supreme Court in the
first instance and, ultimately, demeans the dignitary interest. After outlining the federal
and state frameworks and explaining the misapplication of the California due process
tests by the state’s courts, this Note urges a clearer definition of the due process trigger and
more vigorous consideration of the dignitary interest in order to achieve a truer
appreciation for and greater protection of an individual’s position before a state actor.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. I would like to
thank Professor Reuel Schiller for his advice and enthusiasm, the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for
their diligence and good humor, the many people who read and commented on this Note, and my friends
and family for all of their love and support. I owe special thanks to my sister, Alicia Tosdal, for her
generosity and strength.
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“From its founding, the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster
1
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.”

Introduction
Justice Frankfurter once wrote, “The requirement of ‘due process’ is
2
not a fair-weather or timid assurance.” Due process is one of the most
august concepts in American law, enshrined in both the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, and protective of both substantive and procedural
3
rights. It is “compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions,
4
and stout confidence in the strength of [our] democratic faith . . . .” At

1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970).
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
3. Id. at 174 (“Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional
system.”).
4. Id. at 162–63.
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its core, due process concerns procedural fairness, which serves as a
buffer between the people and government action and is “our main
5
assurance that there will be equal justice under law.” Due process
affirms a person’s identity and recognizes her inherent dignity when
confronted by the state; it does so by mandating some form of notice and
6
opportunity to be heard prior to being harmed by a state actor.
Procedural due process is particularly vital for guarding the individual
from arbitrary deprivations by administrative agencies, as these are the
sites of most encounters between individuals and the state—and,
arguably, where the state actor is least accountable to the individual.
The United States Supreme Court has highlighted the importance of
recognizing and protecting an individual’s rights and interests in the face
7
of adverse state action by administrative agencies in Goldberg v. Kelly,
8
9
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth and Mathews v. Eldridge. The
California Supreme Court followed suit in the development of its own
procedural due process doctrine. The seminal California case, People v.
Ramirez, focuses on a person’s dignitary interest as a central component
10
of the state’s procedural due process doctrine. However, the subsequent
application of Ramirez has become confused and unpredictable,
requiring a reexamination of the state’s procedural due process tests to
ensure that it fulfills the promise of due process protections.
This Note describes ongoing inconsistencies in California
procedural due process doctrine and argues that the California due
process tests ought to be as vigorous and expansive as the California
Supreme Court in Ramirez intended them to be. Part I briefly outlines
the underlying principles and history of both procedural due process and
the administrative state. Part I further sets forth the respective federal
and California due process frameworks and highlights the differences
between them, concentrating on Ramirez’s emphasis on protecting an
individual’s dignity. Part II examines appellate courts’ application of the
California frameworks and evaluates the results. Part II ultimately
demonstrates that the application of the California due process doctrine
is, at best, inconsistent and does not lead to substantially different results
than the federal doctrine. It asserts that the incoherent application of the
California doctrine shows its ineffectiveness in accomplishing Ramirez’s
original goal: restoring fundamental tenets of due process to the heart of
the due process analysis.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See id. at 170 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979).
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Finally, Part III analyzes possible solutions to help the California
courts achieve the original purpose of Ramirez. It proposes two possible
solutions to the problem. The California courts could easily continue to
apply the federal procedural due process thresholds that were expressly
rejected in Ramirez. But the California Supreme Court has not yet
abandoned this position, and the continued use of the federal test
contravenes binding precedent from the state’s highest court. Moreover,
adopting the federal framework would fail to recognize the inherent
dignity of an individual facing a more powerful state actor for the
purported benefit of lowering administrative costs and increasing
government efficiency. Instead, California courts should rearticulate the
state’s procedural due process doctrine in order to realize the intent and
potential of the Ramirez decision.

I. Background
11
Due process is an old, enduring concept. A “guarantee of fair
12
13
procedure” in administrative and judicial adjudicative contexts, the
touchstone of due process has long been protecting individuals against
14
arbitrary state action by providing notice and an opportunity to be
15
heard. “The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for
11. Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law: Cases and Comments
768 (10th ed. 2003) (stating that due process was born in thirteenth century England); see also Edward
L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 1044, 1044 (1984) (“By far the
oldest of our civil rights, [procedural due process’s] content seemed so clear to prior generations that
they included the term ‘due process’ in the fifth and fourteenth amendments virtually without
discussion.” (footnote omitted)); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1978).
12. Strauss et al., supra note 11.
13. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (“[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or
make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that
those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process.
On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication . . . it is not
necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.”).
14. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (stating that the requirements of due process,
as conceived in England and transported to the United States, are designed to protect individual
subjects from arbitrary state action).
15. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) (“Due process
requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” (quoting Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. And it is to this end, of
course, that summons or equivalent notice is employed.” (citation omitted)); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900) (“[The requirements of] the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . are complied with, provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to
have been due process of law the person condemned has had sufficient notice and adequate
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the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic
16
government must therefore practice fairness . . . .” Recognition of a
person’s dignity in the course of an encounter with a state actor is
particularly important to procedural fairness, because such recognition
respects these elementary rights and affirms that person’s membership in
17
society.
The first administrative agencies emerged from the War
Department, following Independence and the end of the Revolutionary
18
War. Beginning with the New Deal, as the government struggled to
address the impact of the Great Depression, administrative agencies like
the Social Security Administration and the National Labor Relations
Board became increasingly integral to the operation of the United
19
States. Now, agencies administer nearly every aspect of American life,
from dispensing drivers and professional licenses to determining
eligibility for disability and welfare benefits; from regulating commercial
activities to operating prisons; and from establishing tenure to providing
20
for rehabilitation. Consequently, individuals frequently confront the
government through administrative actions that affect some of the most
fundamental aspects of their lives.
The Constitution does not explicitly contemplate this method of
governance. Article II charges the executive branch with the duty to
21
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Through the
Appointments Clause, the President is further authorized to appoint
“Officers of the United States,” though Congress retains the power to
vest appointment of “inferior” officers in other branches of the
22
government. Likewise, Congress is empowered to pass laws that are
“necessary and proper” for executing those powers vested in the United
23
States government “or in any Department or Officer thereof” by the

opportunity has been afforded him to defend.”).
16. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
17. See Saphire, supra note 11, at 124.
18. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–
1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256, 1274–76, 1283 (2006).
19. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 17.
20. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of
Bureaucracy 5 (1990). See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)
(tenure); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer of prisoners); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) (disability benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); People v.
Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1979) (rehabilitation); Smith v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (Ct. App. 1988) (professional competency).
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
22. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
23. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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Constitution. Thus, the Constitution provides for making law,
24
interpreting law, and executing law, but is silent on administering law.
Instead, administration blossomed in the interstitial space between
25
the branches of government. Administrative law developed in response
to the burgeoning administrative state, concerned with governmental
26
efficiency, preservation of individual rights, and social well-being. New
Deal programs created a “reliance principle: The public came to look
27
upon government as its guarantor against acute economic deprivation.”
Because government agencies multiplied without a regulatory
framework, such as procedural safeguards, Congress passed the
28
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. The APA “divide[d] the
universe of administrative action into two general decisionmaking
29
categories, rulemaking and adjudication.” For adjudications, the statute
“set[s] out a fairly elaborate scheme of procedural requirements[, using]
30
the judicial hearing as its decisionmaking model.” California’s own
31
Administrative Procedure Act predated the federal counterpart and
32
“was a pioneering effort.” The administrative state has only expanded
since the statutes were enacted: “We now presume the existence of
highly institutionalized methods of presidential and congressional
control, the impersonality of office, the hierarchical organization of a
33
career civil service and a highly articulated system of judicial review.”
Despite the statutory constraints on administrative action, this expansion
increases the chances of an arbitrary agency action by an administrative
34
agency.
Since the New Deal, courts have struggled to address two central
questions of due process in administrative actions: whether or not a

24. See Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1266.
25. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 35.
26. Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1264; see also Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law,
75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 614, 614 (1927) (“The control of banking, insurance, public utilities, finance,
industry, the professions, health and morals, in sum, the manifold response of government to the
forces and needs of modern society, is building up a body of laws not written by legislatures, and of
adjudications not made by courts and not subject to their revision. These powers are lodged in a vast
congeries of agencies.”).
27. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 16.
28. See id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
29. See Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 16–17.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 11340–11365 (West 1998).
32. Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on California’s
New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 Tulsa L.J. 297, 298 (1996). The California statute was enacted
in 1945. Id. One measure adopted by the original Act was independent hearing officers, which “has yet
to be adopted by the federal government.” Id.
33. Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1269.
34. Edley, supra note 20, at 6 (“As the bureaucracy’s role has grown, so have the risks and
benefits associated with official action.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The
Struggle for Auto Safety 8 (1990) (“The individual and the social stakes in regulation are high.”).
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particular state action triggers due process; and, once due process is
implicated, what procedures are sufficient to protect an individual from
35
arbitrary government action. For courts, these questions raise a “basic
problem [of] translat[ing] a protection developed for judicial trials into
36
the administrative context.” State courts have mostly adopted or
37
applied due process tests akin to, or coextensive with, the federal test.
However, California is one state that has sought to expand the federal
38
framework. In some respects, the California Supreme Court has been

35. Strauss et al., supra note 11, at 768.
36. Rubin, supra note 11, at 1046.
37. There are numerous examples of state courts relying on the federal due process doctrine. See
City of Dora v. Beavers, 692 So. 2d 808, 811 n.4 (Ala. 1997); Moore v. Watson, 429 So. 2d 1036, 1038
(Ala. 1983); Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 36 (Alaska 1980); In re MH-2008000867, 236 P.3d 405, 408–09 (Ariz. 2010); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.B., 286 S.W.3d 712, 719
(Ark. 2008); Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248–49 (Colo. 2003); State v. Harris, 890 A.2d 559, 570
(Conn. 2006); Hughes v. Div. of Family Servs. 836 A.2d 498, 508 & n.26 (Del. 2003); Brown v. United
States, 682 A.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. 1996); N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d
898, 903 & n.7 (Fla. 2003); Nodvin v. State Bar, 544 S.E.2d 142, 146 (Ga. 2001); Slupecki v. Admin.
Dir. of the Courts, 133 P.3d 1199, 1205 (Haw. 2006); In re True, 645 P.2d 891, 894 (Idaho 1982); People
ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 796 (Ill. 2009); Wilson v. Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.,
385 N.E.2d 438, 443–44 (Ind. 1979); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 770 N.W.2d 334,
340 (Iowa 2009); State v. Easterling, 213 P.3d 418, 426 (Kan. 2009); Transp. Cabinet v. Cassity,
912 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Ky. 1995); Arriola v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 809 So. 2d 932, 938–39 (La. 2002); In
re Amberley D., 775 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Me. 2001); Rhoads v. Sommer, 931 A.2d 508, 525 (Md. 2007);
Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 903 N.E.2d 1098, 1109 (Mass. 2009); In re Rood, 763 N.W.2d 587, 598
(Mich. 2009); C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 2008); Hinds Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. v. R.B.,
10 So. 3d 387, 402 (Miss. 2008); Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Mo. 2007); In re
Mental Health of E.T., 191 P.3d 470, 474 (Mont. 2008); Kenley v. Neth, 712 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Neb.
2006); J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int’l Grp., LLC, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040 (Nev. 2010); In re Kilton, 939
A.2d 198, 206 (N.H. 2007); Jamgochian v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 952 A.2d 1060, 1071 (N.J. 2008);
Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 229 P.3d 494, 507
(N.M. 2010); In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 487 (N.Y. 2004); State v. Thompson, 508 S.E.2d 277, 286 (N.C.
1998); In re D.C.S.H.C., 733 N.W.2d 902, 906 (N.D. 2007); State ex rel. Haylett v. Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Comp., 720 N.E.2d 901, 907–08 (Ohio 1999); In re A.M., 13 P.3d 484, 487–88 (Okla. 2000);
Stogsdill v. Bd. of Parole, 154 P.3d 91, 94 (Or. 2007); R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 147
(Pa. 1994); State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 576–77 (R.I. 2009); S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Wilson,
574 S.E.2d 730, 734 (S.C. 2002); State v. $1,010.00 in Am. Currency, 722 N.W.2d 92, 97–98 (S.D. 2006);
Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 230–31 (Tenn. 2010); Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d
315, 319–20 (Tex. 2009); In re Arnovick, 52 P.3d 1246, 1251 (Utah 2002); Gabriel v. Town of Duxbury,
764 A.2d 1224, 1226 (Vt. 2000); Krieger v. Virginia, 567 S.E.2d 557, 564 (Va. Ct. App. 2002); Post v.
City of Tacoma, 217 P.3d 1179, 1186 (Wash. 2009); State ex rel. Jeanette H. v. Pancake, 529 S.E.2d 865,
874 (W. Va. 2000); In re Daniel R.S., 706 N.W.2d 269, 284–85 (Wis. 2005); In re CC, 102 P.3d 890, 895
(Wyo. 2004). But see Jamgochian, 952 A.2d at 1070 (noting that the New Jersey due process doctrine
can provide for greater procedural protection than the federal test).
38. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626–28 (Cal. 1979). Justice Mosk, author of the Ramirez
opinion, once said that he hoped that he was able to protect people from “a monstrous society that
grows constantly” while he was on the bench. Interview by Germaine LaBerge with Stanley Mosk,
Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, in S.F., Cal. 93 (July 22, 1998), transcript available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
archives/oral-history/pdf/mosk.pdf. Mosk’s opinion in Ramirez is emblematic of this approach: Mosk’s
rationale for rejecting the federal due process doctrine suggests that his core concern was with
protecting citizens from arbitrary deprivations in an increasingly bureaucratized society. See discussion
infra Part I.B.
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successful in providing greater protections for individuals at the mercy of
state action. In others, however, the court has managed to muddy the
waters so that the state due process framework no longer fulfills its
original promise.
A. The Federal Approach to Procedural Due Process
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
39
without due process of law.” Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any
40
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The
U.S. Supreme Court crafted the federal due process framework in its
41
decisions in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth and Mathews v.
42
Eldridge.
1.

Invoking Due Process

Prior to Roth, access to due process protections depended on
whether an affected individual’s interest could be characterized as a right
or a privilege: Due process was not constitutionally required if the
43
interest was not a right. For instance, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, a short-order cook for a restaurant that
served workers at the Naval Gun Factory suddenly and summarily had
her security clearance revoked, which prevented her from going to
44
work. The Court reasoned that her private interest in continued
employment was not a right to continued employment, but was merely a
45
privilege. Indeed, the Navy’s decision to revoke her security clearance
46
did nothing to prevent her from finding employment elsewhere.
Procedural due process protections were not constitutionally required for
47
privileges—only rights.
By comparison, the central inquiry of the modern approach, set
forth in Roth, is whether the private interest in question constitutes
either a liberty or a property interest as identified by the Fifth or
48
Fourteenth Amendments. The Roth plaintiff taught at a state university

39. U.S. Const. amend. V.
40. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
42. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
43. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Bailey v.
Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
44. 367 U.S. at 887–88, 894.
45. Id. at 896–99.
46. Id. at 898–99.
47. Id. at 896–99.
48. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 571 (1972); see also Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (deciding a due process challenge under the Fifth Amendment and
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49

under a one-year contract. At the end of the year, the school declined to
50
rehire him, but gave no reason for its decision. Roth then sued the
school for violating his procedural due process rights under the
51
Fourteenth Amendment. In addressing his claims, the Court held that
whether due process is required depends on the “nature of the interest at
stake,” as the amendment protects persons from deprivation of life,
52
liberty, or property.
The Court broadly interpreted liberty interests to include “freedom
from bodily restraint[,] . . . the right . . . to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life,” to learn, to marry, to make a home, to
raise children, to worship “according to the dictates of [one’s] own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as
53
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Additionally,
injuries to reputation could, on occasion, implicate a protected liberty
54
interest.
By contrast, the Court took a narrower approach in defining a
protected property interest. The Court stated that the “procedural
protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a
55
person has already acquired in specific benefits.” Property interests are
created and circumscribed by “existing rules or understandings that stem
56
from an independent source such as state law.” In order for an
individual to have a property interest in a benefit, that individual must
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to, not just an “abstract need” or
57
“unilateral expectation” for, the benefit.
Ultimately, Roth had neither a liberty nor a property interest in his
continued employment sufficient to trigger due process. While the school
did not renew Roth’s one-year employment contract, it also did not level
any charges against him that would have harmed his reputation or
58
standing in the community or his chances of future employment. Thus,

citing Roth).
49. Id. at 566.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 569.
52. Id. at 571.
53. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a person’s good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and
an opportunity to be heard are essential.”). But see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1991)
(defamation does not implicate a protected liberty interest); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–02 (1976)
(same).
55. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576.
56. Id. at 577.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 573–74.
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59

there was no liberty interest at stake. Furthermore, he did not have
tenure, which would have implicated a protected property interest by
60
entitling him to continued employment.
Subsequently, part of the analysis of whether or not a protected
interest is created focuses on the extent to which an agency’s discretion is
restricted by statutes, rules, or regulations, because those restrictions
condition claims of entitlement and set ascertainable standards for state
61
action. As articulated in Roth, Wisconsin state law did not contain any
eligibility requirements for continued employment other than tenure:
“State law thus clearly leaves the decision whether to rehire a
nontenured teacher for another year to the unfettered discretion of
62
university officials.” Consequently, no protected property interest was
created. Similarly, in Meachum v. Fano, a later case addressing liberty
interests of prisoners, the Court stated, “Whatever expectation the
prisoner may have in remaining at a particular prison . . . is too
ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process
protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for
63
whatever reason or for no reason at all.” If the prison officials could
transfer prisoners only for cause or for certain reasons specified by a
statute or regulation, then perhaps a protected liberty interest would
64
have been implicated, triggering due process. As described below, the
California Supreme Court took particular exception to the Supreme
65
Court’s reliance on state legislatures to establish protected interests.
2.

Procedural Sufficiency

While the essence of adequate due process is notice and an
66
opportunity to be heard, the amount and type of procedure required
67
varies according to the circumstances of a particular case. Due process
59. Id. at 575.
60. Id. at 567, 569.
61. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (stating that
property interests are created by “independent source[s] . . . that support claims of entitlement
to . . . benefits”); People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 625 (Cal. 1979) (“When the asserted interest is
derived exclusively from state law, it will be recognized as within the scope of due process liberty if the
state statute protects the interest by permitting its forfeiture only on the happening of specified
conditions.”).
62. Roth, 408 U.S. at 567.
63. 427 U.S. at 228.
64. See id. This analysis of liberty interests is notably more restrictive than the Roth analysis.
However, Meachum concerned the liberty interest of individuals already deprived of liberty, and, as a
result, addressed that interest in an already-restricted context. Additionally, Meachum was decided
post-Roth, and in Roth, the Court in fact noted that there were “boundaries” to the terms “liberty”
and “property” in the Fourteenth Amendment. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
65. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
66. See authorities cited supra note 15.
67. E.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) (“[N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”);
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is a flexible concept, and courts examine procedural sufficiency in light
69
of the facts before them. Hence, what procedures are due ranges from
70
formal trial-like proceedings to allowing for a single written response.
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to evaluate
71
the adequacy of existing procedures. There, the Court instructed that
reviewing courts consider three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
72
requirement would entail.

The Court then balanced the petitioner’s interests in having a hearing
prior to the termination of his disability benefits with the government’s
interest in conserving resources by providing less procedure than a full
73
judicial hearing. On balance, the petitioner was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing prior to the local Social Security office’s decision to
terminate his disability benefits, because existing procedures satisfied
74
procedural due process. Those procedures included an initial notice that
stated the reasons for an adverse preliminary determination and
provided an opportunity to respond prior to termination, a second notice
upon termination that advised the petitioner of his right to seek the
agency’s reconsideration, and a nonadversarial evidentiary hearing if the
termination of petitioner’s benefits remained in effect after
75
reconsideration. Accordingly, the risk in the existing procedures of
erroneously ending petitioner’s benefits was relatively low, and
additional procedures would have only increased costs without enhancing
76
the accuracy of the determination. As an additional safeguard, the
petitioner would have been entitled to retroactive payments if, at any
77
time, the termination was found to be in error.
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Oberholzer v.
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 975 P.2d 663, 675–76 (Cal. 1999); Cal. Ass’n of PSES v. State Dep’t
of Educ., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 2006).
68. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.”).
69. Id.
70. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979). Sometimes, simply the availability of a
damages suit after injury can be sufficient procedural protection. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 677–79 & nn.45–47 (1977) (holding the same).
71. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
72. Id. at 335.
73. Id. at 348.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 337–39, 349.
76. See id. at 342–45.
77. Id. at 339.
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In short, as a threshold matter for due process protections in the
administrative context, a person subject to an agency action can invoke
procedural due process protections if the state action implicates a liberty
or property interest encompassed by the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Once due process is implicated, the sufficiency of the
available procedures is evaluated based on a balance of three factors: (1)
the private interest in question, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
under existing procedures and the probable value of additional
procedures, and (3) the government’s interest in the action and
78
proceeding. As Part I.B. describes below, California built upon the
federal analysis in establishing its own doctrine for procedural due
process in the administrative context.
B. California’s Approach to Procedural Due Process
Like the United States Constitution, the California Constitution
provides that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
79
without due process of law.” Despite the similarities between the
constitutional provisions, the development of California’s procedural due
process doctrine mirrors the development of the federal counterpart in
some ways, but rejects it in others. In 1979, the California Supreme Court
expressly critiqued the Supreme Court’s approach in Roth and set forth a
new framework for procedural due process in California in People v.
80
Ramirez.
In Ramirez, the appellant had previously been convicted of drug
possession and was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center
81
(“CRC”) for addiction treatment. He was later granted outpatient status
82
pursuant to section 3151 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code,
was subsequently arrested for disturbing the peace and resisting arrest, and
then was determined to be “‘not a fit subject for confinement or treatment’
83
in the CRC.” Ramirez challenged his exclusion from the treatment
center, arguing that the agency’s decisionmaking procedures denied him
84
due process. The California Supreme Court agreed, and redrew the
framework for both the trigger for due process protections and the test for
procedural sufficiency. The court took issue with two aspects of the federal
approach in particular. First, the court objected to the state’s ability under

78. Id. at 335.
79. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(a). The California Constitution has a similar, though separately
enumerated, due process clause for criminal cases: “Persons may not . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” Id. § 15.
80. See 599 P.2d 622, 625–28 (Cal. 1979).
81. Id. at 624.
82. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 3151 (West 2008).
83. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 624 (quoting the Director of Corrections).
84. Id. at 625.
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the federal framework to write a protected interest out of a statute by
85
providing the agency with unlimited discretion. Specifically, when the
legislature does so, it effectively eliminates the trigger for due process
86
under the United States Constitution. Second, the court felt that the
balancing test for procedural safeguards failed to account for the values
87
underlying due process. The Ramirez tests purportedly address these
concerns. But, in fact, the language of the due process trigger is easily
subject to multiple interpretations, and the test for procedural sufficiency
is unevenly applied. Consequently, California’s due process doctrine has
been muddled ever since Ramirez.
1.

Invoking Due Process

In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court focused on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s requirement that a liberty or property interest, as defined
by state law or other independent, nonconstitutional source of law, be
88
implicated in order to trigger any due process right. Writing for the
majority, Justice Mosk criticized this requirement, stating,
Its effect is that as long as the interest is not one that would otherwise
fall within the scope of constitutional concepts of liberty, the state may
“define it out” of the due process clause by specifying that it is subject
to the unconditional discretion of the person in charge of its
89
administration.

Additionally, “the state may apparently limit the scope of the
clause . . . irrespective of the extent to which ‘grievous loss’ or ‘substantial
90
adverse impact’ results.”
According to the court, requiring statutory constraints on agency power
in order to trigger due process did not sufficiently account for the
importance of “promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in
governmental decision making when individuals are subject to deprivatory
91
action.” The court maintained that if the principal purpose of due process
is to minimize abuses of government discretion, then courts “must evaluate
the extent to which procedural protections can be tailored to promote more
accurate and reliable administrative decisions,” instead of evaluating
“whether or not the state limits administrative control over a statutory
92
benefit or deprivation by the occurrence of specified conditions . . . .”

85. Id. at 626.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 625.
89. Id. at 626.
90. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
242 (1976)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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In other words, if one of the purposes of due process is to protect
individuals from arbitrary government action, then relying on the legislature
to create a protectable liberty or property interest defeats that very purpose.
Indeed, the more discretion an agency has, the greater the risk that an
93
agency action will arbitrarily harm an individual. “[I]f agencies or officials
administering entitlement programs fail to devise, adopt or implement
processes for deprivatory action that respond to inherent dignitary values, it
seems highly unlikely that such processes will be imposed upon them
94
through nonjudicial means.” Essentially the court’s point was that a state
legislature could write a legitimate liberty or property interest out of a
statute by declining to limit an agency’s discretion. An agency with unlimited
discretion is, of course, unlikely to voluntarily limit its exercise of that power.
And, an individual at the mercy of the agency is more likely to be subjected
to an arbitrary government action with neither adequate procedural
protections nor recourse to obtain them, because the statute at issue created
no trigger. Thus, the federal trigger fails to minimize abuses of government
discretion.
In short, although the Ramirez court might have ultimately agreed with
95
the outcome under the federal due process analysis, it explicitly rejected
the federal framework in determining whether the Director of Corrections’s
decision to change the defendant’s status in the CRC’s program implicated
96
procedural due process. The court stated,
[W]hen a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due
process analysis must start not with a[n] . . . attempt to decide whether
the statute has created an “entitlement” that can be defined as ‘liberty’
or “property,” but with an assessment of what procedural protections
are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private
97
interests at stake.

The court went on to hold that “due process safeguards required for
protection of an individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in the
context of the principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures
98
is a substantive element of one’s liberty.”
As might be expected, the language of the opinion naturally leads to
multiple interpretations of the appropriate due process trigger. The
application of Ramirez in the lower courts amply demonstrates the
confusion Mosk’s opinion and its newly-announced principles
99
engendered. On the one hand, in light of the court’s concerns with the
amount of deference to state legislatures, the reference to a statutorily
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id. at 625–26.
Saphire, supra note 11, at 143.
See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 625–26.
Id.
Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
See discussion infra Part II.
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conferred benefit or interest implies a natural due process trigger created
by statute, regardless of the amount or degree of statutory limitations on
an administering agency’s discretion. Procedural sufficiency would then be
analyzed by balancing the competing private and government interests
against the principle of freedom from arbitrary government action. In light
of the court’s grave concern with the ability of a state legislature to write in
or deliberately omit a trigger for procedural protections, it is also unclear
whether the court intended for the presence of a statutorily conferred
benefit to serve as part of a trigger, or if it is mentioned simply because
Ramirez was granted outpatient status pursuant to provisions of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code. Indeed, another interpretation
of the opinion is that the tests set forth in Ramirez only apply in those
circumstances where the legislature happens to have specifically provided
a benefit; another due process trigger—though undefined in Ramirez—
100
would be implicated where no statutorily conferred benefit existed.
On the other hand, Ramirez also appears to state that the appropriate
inquiry for triggering due process is whether procedural protections are
constitutionally required based on a balance of the private and
governmental interests, rather than on the statutory creation of a benefit
or interest. In other words, the balance of the interests is “separate and
independent” from the terms of a statute—not based simply on the
101
interests identified in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If this is
accurate, then the California Supreme Court apparently tried to revisit the
due process trigger set forth in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers—where
procedural due process was required when a private interest could be
102
characterized as a right, rather than a privilege —except that the Ramirez
court did not expressly return to the rights-versus-privilege dichotomy.
Indeed, the court appears to have applied the balancing test as the trigger
100. At least one appellate court has adopted this interpretation. See Schultz v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 911–12 (Ct. App. 1984) (“We also conclude that People v. Ramirez,
which sets forth a test for invocation of procedural due process rights under the state Constitution
(where a statutory interest is subject to deprivation), should not be extended to this case, which
implicates no statutory interest. Rather, we conclude Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. continues to define
the circumstances in which procedural protections of due process will be afforded employees of public
entities who can show no statutory interest subject to deprivation.” (citations omitted)). See generally
discussion infra Part II.A.
101. See, e.g., Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 214 (Cal. 1980) (“In [Ramirez], this court held that
the extent to which procedural due process relief is available under the California Constitution
depends on a careful weighing of the private and governmental interests involved.” (internal citations
omitted)). The court specifically differentiated between the federal test and the state test on the
grounds that the federal test required a finding of a protected interest. Id. at 214 n.6; see also
Hernandez v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 634 P.2d 917, 923 n.12 (Cal. 1981) (“[O]ur court recognized
that under the California Constitution ‘freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a
substantive element of one’s liberty’ so that ‘when an individual is subjected to deprivatory
governmental action, he always has a due process liberty interest both in fair and unprejudiced
decision-making and in being treated with respect and dignity.’” (quoting Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 622)).
102. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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in Ramirez: The opinion describes and weighs the interests at stake before
concluding that due process was implicated and greater procedural
103
protections were required.
The foregoing interpretations result in broader, more inclusive due
process triggers than are possible under the federal framework, if for no
other reason than because they abandon the restrictive categories of
Fourteenth Amendment liberty and property interests. But, competing
interpretations provide murky guidance to lower appellate courts. The
degree of ambiguity in the Ramirez test is evident in opinions from these
courts, where confusion about which methodology to apply is rampant. As
Part II.A describes below, some courts have adhered to the view that
procedural due process is implicated on a balance of the interests involved
and in light of the principle of protecting people from arbitrary actions.
Others have relied on the phrase “statutorily conferred benefit” to limit
104
the scope of the due process trigger. Especially given its departure from
an already-established test, the court’s failure to clearly define its own due
process trigger is extremely problematic for establishing and maintaining
vigorous procedural protections for individuals facing the administrative
state: It is unclear when a person’s rights will be affected such that she
must receive due process protections. Though due process is a flexible
concept, the Ramirez court’s trigger analysis is overly elastic. Perhaps
ironically, critical questions of fairness are raised when individuals—let
alone agencies, the state legislature, and the courts—are unclear about
when procedural protections are due because the court has failed to
delineate the trigger clearly. Moreover, the lack of clarity induces chaos in
the lower courts. Faced with mixed signals, lower courts increasingly fall
back on the more definite federal due process trigger, which the California
Supreme Court has expressly rejected.
2.

Procedural Sufficiency

In addition to its concern about the federal trigger for due process,
the Ramirez court objected to the balancing test articulated in Eldridge.
Specifically, the court opined that the federal trigger failed to recognize
“the dignity and worth of the individual by treating [her] as an equal, fully
105
participating and responsible member of society.” The harm caused by a
106
government treating an individual as a “nonperson” is so grave that,

103. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631–32. Ramirez had interests in receiving notice of (including the
reasons for) the termination of his outpatient status, in ensuring that the determination was based on
accurate information, and in having an opportunity to make his case to the Director. Id. at 631–32. The
government’s interests were in maintaining the safety and progress of the other participants, as well as
evaluating the probabilities of successful rehabilitation. Id. at 630.
104. See discussion infra Part II.A.
105. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626.
106. Id. (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv.
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even where additional procedure would not change the agency
determination, “due process may nevertheless require that certain
procedural protections be granted . . . in order to protect important
107
dignitary values” and to affirm an individual’s personhood.
In light of these concerns, the California Supreme Court recast the
test for determining the safeguards required by procedural due process.
108
Returning to the “touchstone of due process,” the court held that the
procedure due must be viewed in light of the underlying precept that
“freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element
109
of one’s liberty.” As with the federal test, the extent and nature of the
procedure due depends on a balancing of interests at stake in each
110
context. In addition to the Eldridge factors, California courts were
directed to consider a “dignitary interest in informing individuals of the
nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to
present their side of the story before a responsible governmental
111
official.”
In Ramirez, the court ultimately held that the defendant was entitled
to additional procedural safeguards when the CRC ordered his exclusion
112
from the rehabilitation program, with little procedural protection beyond
113
subsequent judicial review. Ramirez was entitled to an opportunity to
respond to the grounds for exclusion prior to the final decision; such an
opportunity was meaningful if Ramirez received a written statement of the
reasons for exclusion, access to the information considered in making the
determination, “notice of [his] right to respond,” and a chance to respond
114
orally.
Overall, both of these California due process analyses differ from
their federal counterparts. First, where the federal analysis of procedural
due process focuses on interests encompassed by the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the California approach focuses on a broader
protection of individual interests and benefits. Specifically, the California
procedural due process trigger appears to require either that a person’s
private interests outweigh those of the government such that due process is
necessary to guard against arbitrary state action, or that an individual be

L. Rev. 1, 30 (1977)).
107. Id. at 626–27.
108. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
109. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 628.
112. Id. at 625.
113. Id. at 631.
114. Id. at 631–32. Ultimately, the court vacated the judgment below because the defendant was no
longer “in custody under the judgments from which he appeal[ed]” and, consequently, remanding for a
new exclusion hearing would have been inappropriate. Id. at 633.
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115

deprived of a statutorily conferred interest. Second, the sufficiency of
process depends on consideration of an additional factor in the balancing
116
test—namely, the dignitary interest of providing notice and a hearing.
The next Part discusses the application of these two tests by California
appellate courts.

II. The Application of RAMIREZ by the California Appellate
Courts
Once the California Supreme Court split from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence, the state’s lower courts were left to determine the
contours of these new tests. As this Part demonstrates, California courts
applied the Ramirez due process trigger to encompass a wider range of
interests and benefits than covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, but
failed to interpret the trigger uniformly. Furthermore, the four-factor
balancing test for procedural sufficiency has, by and large, proven to be
neither more expansive nor more accommodating to a person’s dignity
than the federal three-factor balancing test.
A. Invoking Due Process
Unlike the federal test, neither a property nor a liberty interest
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment is a prerequisite for due process
117
Left unsettled, however, is what the
protections under Ramirez.
prerequisites actually are. In the fifteen years after Ramirez, the test was
applied primarily in criminal, juvenile, and mental health cases, as well as
118
in a few employment cases. By 1984, the California Supreme Court had
yet to apply Ramirez to a situation where no statutorily conferred benefit
or interest existed—but it had made broad statements regarding the
119
applicability of the test.
Since Ramirez, some courts have interpreted the California
procedural trigger solely based on balancing private and governmental
interests, and on considerations of arbitrariness in existing procedures. For
example, in Saleeby v. State Bar, the California legislature had authorized
the creation of the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) in section 6140.5 of the
120
Business and Professions Code; the State Bar established the fund and
115. See id. at 627; see also Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 534–35 (Cal. 1985).
116. Ramirez, 599 P. 2d at 627–28.
117. See Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 922 (Ct. App. 1984).
118. Id. at 918 n.7.
119. Id. at 919 (discussing the California Supreme Court’s use of Ramirez in Hernandez v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 634 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1981), and Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210 (Cal.
1980)); see also Saleeby, 702 P.2d at 534–35 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to due process where
plaintiff’s interest was statutory but not necessarily a liberty or property interest); Las Lomas Land
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 518 (Ct. App. 2009); Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic
Fed’n, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 816–17 (Ct. App. 2001).
120. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6140.5 (West 2008).
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121

created rules and regulations for its administration. The petitioner
sought reimbursement from the CSF, but only received partial
122
compensation. Under the federal approach, the petitioner would not
have been entitled to procedural due process, because the Bar’s discretion
in disbursing money from the CSF was not restricted by the statute;
Saleeby thus had no right to, or property interest in, an award from the
123
CSF. However, the petitioner had a right to procedure under the
California approach where “the announced grounds [of the agency’s
124
decision were] patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” The court held that
procedural due process was triggered, in part because the petitioner did
not have a chance to respond to assertions made in the course of the
125
reimbursement determination. He was also not provided with the
126
reasons for the determination. Thus, the determination was ultimately
arbitrary, and due process protections were required.
However, many lower courts applying the trigger for due process
articulated in Ramirez interpreted the test narrowly to require a statutorily
127
conferred benefit or interest. The language of the Ramirez opinion
seems to support this interpretation in its reference to deprivation of a
128
statutorily conferred benefit. For example, in In re Thomas, a doctor
jailed on drug-related charges applied to participate in a work furlough
129
program and was denied. He challenged the decision as a violation of
130
procedural due process. The court acknowledged the creation of a
131
benefit under section 1208 of the California Penal Code in the work
132
furlough program and proceeded to examine the procedures afforded.
The doctor would not have been entitled to procedural due process under
the federal analysis, because the statute gave the program administrator

121. 702 P.2d at 528–29.
122. Id. at 527.
123. Id. at 536.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 535–36.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 918 (Ct. App. 1984)
(“One key unsettled question is whether Ramirez’ analysis will be applied to situations . . . where no
statutory right is at issue.”). Another example is Smith v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, where a
doctor who was ordered to undergo a professional competency exam did not have a protected liberty
or property interest that would trigger due process under the federal framework. 248 Cal. Rptr. 704,
709–10 (Ct. App. 1988). However, his procedural due process rights were implicated under the
California framework, because he had a statutorily conferred benefit or interest. Id. at 710–11; see also
San Jose Police Officers Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731–32 (Ct. App. 1988).
128. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 624 (Cal. 1979).
129. 206 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720–22 (Ct. App. 1984).
130. Id. at 722.
131. Cal. Penal. Code § 1208 (West 2010).
132. 206 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
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unfettered discretion and thus did not create a liberty or property interest
133
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Likewise, the court in Schultz v. Regents of the University of
California maintained that due process was triggered by a statutorily
conferred benefit or interest; otherwise, an individual would have to
134
identify an interest covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case,
the plaintiff contended that the procedures used to reclassify his job
135
violated due process. The court disagreed, maintaining that neither a
statutorily conferred benefit nor an interest encompassed by the
136
Fourteenth Amendment was implicated to trigger due process.
Similarly, the court in Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation
required a statutorily conferred benefit in order to trigger California
137
procedural due process protections. In that case, the plaintiff challenged
a decision that deemed him ineligible to play on a high school football
138
team. The plaintiff’s due process rights were not triggered, because he
did not identify a statutorily conferred benefit or interest in his
139
participation.
Finally, the court in Gresher v. Anderson ruled that the existence of a
statutorily conferred benefit or interest was a threshold matter for due
140
process protections. There, the plaintiff sued the Department of Social
141
The agency had
Services for procedural due process violations.
developed procedures for exempting certain community care facility
employees from a ban against hiring individuals with certain criminal
142
convictions. The availability of an exemption for these individuals was a
statutorily conferred benefit; hence due process was triggered under
143
Ramirez.
These interpretations of the Ramirez due process trigger undermine
the precise goal that the California Supreme Court sought to achieve,
which is more explicitly articulated in the balancing test: recognition of an

133. Id. at 724.
134. 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 919 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 782–83
(Cal. 1975)).
135. Id. at 911–13.
136. Id. at 922.
137. 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 816 (Ct. App. 2001).
138. Id. at 803–04.
139. Id. at 817.
140. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 418–19 (Ct. App. 2005).
141. Id. at 411.
142. Id. at 411–13.
143. See id. at 418–19. Arguably, the interest in continued employment was a property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court addressed this only in passing. Id. at 419
(“The Department denies that any private interest cognizable under the federal or state due process
clauses is affected by the ‘exemption needed’ letters. However it is beyond dispute that both these
clauses ‘protect[] the pursuit of one’s profession from abridgment by arbitrary state action.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Endler v. Schutzbank, 436 P.2d 297, 302 (1968))).
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individual’s dignity in administrative adjudications. Paradoxically, differing
interpretations in the appellate courts deprive affected parties of notice,
because it is unclear which interpretation a court will apply and find due
process implicated. The opacity of the language in Ramirez leads appellate
courts to choose these different paths, and the Ramirez trigger therefore
prevents courts from reaching the objective of Ramirez. Although the poor
guidance from the California Supreme Court is troubling and leads to
unpredictable results, procedural due process is still triggered in California
where it would not be under the federal framework of circumscribed
144
liberty and property interests. But, the question remains as to what
extent the balancing test expands on the federal base.
B. Procedural Sufficiency
In requiring courts to consider a dignitary interest, the California
Supreme Court addressed one of its central concerns with the federal
balancing test—that the approach undervalued the importance of
treating an individual “as an equal, fully participating and responsible
145
member of society.” The dignitary interest factor implicates the quality
and sufficiency of the two core components of due process: notice and an
146
opportunity to be heard. In refocusing the due process test on the
dignity of the individual affected by the governmental action, the
California Supreme Court acknowledged that due process may require
greater procedures, even where the outcome of a decision would be the
147
same, in order to value a person’s dignitary interest. For example, in
Ramirez, the dignitary factor led the court to require the Director of the
CRC to provide an excluded prisoner with a “right to respond orally” to
148
the agency’s decision.
However, California courts unevenly apply the Ramirez test for
procedural sufficiency—particularly the dignitary interest factor—under
the best circumstances. The opinions fall into three categories: decisions
149
that continue to apply the federal test without mentioning Ramirez,
decisions that mention Ramirez but either conflate it with the federal test
150
151
or apply only the federal test, and decisions that apply Ramirez. With
respect to the last category, the dignitary interest appears to be most
discussed in those cases where the plaintiff is deprived of benefits and
interests, such as employment, due to a criminal record. Even in these

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See, e.g., Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 534 (Cal. 1985); Ryan, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814.
People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626–27 (Cal. 1979).
See authorities cited supra note 15.
Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27.
Id. at 631.
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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cases, courts perhaps invoke the dignitary factor more often because the
facts more easily lend to such a consideration, rather than because the
courts feel compelled to do so in light of Ramirez.
1.

The Application of the Federal Test

A number of courts continue to apply solely the federal test. For
instance, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate
District applied the Eldridge balancing test to decide that due process
was satisfied in Mohilef v. Janovici, where the city made a determination
152
affecting a couple’s use of their own land. Similarly, in Holmes v.
Hallinan, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District
153
applied the Eldridge test without even mentioning the Ramirez test. In
that case, the court held that due process was unquestionably satisfied
where a fired police officer was provided a hearing, which was necessary
to resolve factual disputes and credibility determinations, and which he
154
chose not to attend despite his opportunity to do so. Practically
speaking, these protections may be the full panoply of procedure
available under any test, and it is unclear what, if any, additional
protections the police officer could have received had the court applied
some iteration of Ramirez. Likewise, in Marvin Lieblein, Inc. v. Shewry,
the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District held that, under the
Eldridge test, due process did not require that the plaintiff, a pharmacist
whose re-enrollment as a Medi-Cal provider was denied, be afforded live
155
testimony and an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the reasons
the U.S. Supreme Court put forth in Eldridge for declining to require
156
additional procedures “appl[ied] with equal force” to the case at hand.
Those reasons were, namely, that the evidence was objective, the
plaintiff received notice of the evidence and the agency’s reasoning for
its decision, the plaintiff was entitled to counsel and to present his case
when challenging an adverse decision, the costs and burdens on the
agency of providing these additional procedures would be significant,
157
and little benefit would be incurred by adding procedures.
The rationale behind the application of the federal test in some
cases appears to be a belief that the scope and protections of procedural
due process in California are coextensive with the scope and protections
158
provided by the federal approach. At least one court has expressly

152. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731 n.18 (Ct. App. 1996).
153. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1998).
154. Id. at 180.
155. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 560–61 (Ct. App. 2006).
156. Id. at 561.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Sandrini Bros. v. Voss, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 767 n.2 (Ct. App. 1992) (“The state [due
process] provision has been considered to be co-extensive with the federal, and the two provisions
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limited the application of the Ramirez test, because it believed it to be
159
too broad. Courts also appear to apply the federal test where there is
160
some indication that the result would be the same under either analysis.
2.

The Application of Both Tests

Then there are those opinions that explicitly refer to the Ramirez
factors for examining the sufficiency of the procedures provided but do
161
not directly apply them, or, instead, conflate them with the Eldridge
factors. For example, in Brown v. City of Los Angeles, the Court of
Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the processes due
to a police officer whose pay grade was reduced by the Los Angeles
162
Police Department. Brown successfully challenged the procedures the
163
police department provided for contesting a pay grade determination.
The court mentioned both the Eldridge and Ramirez tests, listing the
164
factors weighed in each, but it applied only the Eldridge factors and
165
made no further mention of a dignitary interest.
Other justices in that court took the same approach in American
166
Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Garamendi. There, the California Insurance
Commissioner suspended the plaintiff’s license to act as a bail agent after
167
a felony criminal complaint was filed against him. The plaintiff filed a
petition for writ of mandate on the ground that the immediate
suspension of the license violated due process because, among other
claims, the statute did not permit a pre-deprivation hearing and allowed
168
the suspension to be based solely on a criminal complaint. Although
the court mentioned both Ramirez and Eldridge, it explicitly applied the
169
Eldridge balancing test. Perhaps the court found the case similar to two
U.S. Supreme Court cases applying the federal test, namely, Gilbert v.
170
Homar and FDIC v. Mallen. On the other hand, while the court listed

have been held to have the same scope and purpose.”(internal citation omitted)). However, the Court
of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District cited two pre-Ramirez cases to support the proposition. See
id. (citing Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 449–50 (Cal. 1974); Russell v. Carleson, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 502 (Ct. App. 1973)).
159. Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 919 (Ct. App. 1984).
160. See Mohilef v. Janovici, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731 n.18 (Ct. App. 1996).
161. See, e.g., id.
162. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 477 (Ct. App. 2002).
163. Id. at 491.
164. Id. at 487–88.
165. Id. at 491.
166. 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 541 (Ct. App. 2006). Interestingly, a different panel of three appellate justices
overturned the same trial judge’s rulings in both cases.
167. Id. at 544–45.
168. Id. at 545.
169. Id. at 550.
170. See id. at 550–52 (applying Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997), and FDIC v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230 (1988)).
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the Ramirez factors, it did so in an explanatory parenthetical and failed
171
to note any distinction between the two tests. This strongly suggests
that the court either conflated the two tests or discerned no difference
between them, despite the additional dignitary interest factor.
Interestingly, in Conservatorship of Tian L., a civil commitment case
with facts particularly amenable to a discussion of the dignitary interest,
the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District also
commingled the federal and California due process approaches with little
172
discussion of the dignitary interest. While the court described both
173
174
tests, it only applied the federal balancing test. It could be argued that
the court considered the dignitary interest factor as part of its discussion
of the private interests involved. In that portion of the opinion, the court
acknowledged that “civil commitment to a mental hospital, despite its
civil label, threatens a person’s liberty and dignity on as massive a scale
175
as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” However,
the dignitary interest factor tends to support more robust notice and
hearing procedures, requirements that the court discussed within the
176
context of existing safeguards instead of a person’s inherent dignity.
Moreover, the court did not address the dignitary interest as a separate
177
component of the test. Thus, the court neither seriously accounted for
nor applied a dignitary interest in rendering its decision.
3.

The Application of Ramirez and the Dignitary Interest Factor

A number of other courts have applied or incorporated the
dignitary interest into their analyses. For instance, in San Jose Police
Officers Ass’n v. City of San Jose, the California Court of Appeal for the
Sixth Appellate District reasoned that the plaintiff’s dignitary interest
was sufficiently recognized, because he had the chance to ask questions,
give his opinion, produce evidence, and “attempt to change the decision178
maker’s mind.” The plaintiff was a retired police officer who had been

171. See id. at 550.
172. 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 385–88 (Ct. App. 2007).
173. Id. at 385.
174. See id. at 385–88.
175. Id. at 385 (quoting Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 431 (Ct. App.
2006)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
176. See id. at 386–87.
177. See id. at 385–89.
178. 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 736 (Ct. App. 1988). Incidentally, the concurring justice wrote:
I must cry out in protest whenever occasion arises against . . . the endeavor of the California
Supreme Court to infuse different meaning into language of the California Constitution
which is essentially identical to that of its federal counterpart, and thereby to accord certain
Californians greater rights and others correspondingly less protection than are guaranteed
by the United States Constitution.
Id. at 737 (Brauer, J., concurring).
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denied a certificate to carry a weapon in his retirement. Due process
requirements were satisfied under the California approach in this case,
180
but were not even triggered under the federal framework. Even more
summarily than the San Jose Police Officers Ass’n court, the Court of
Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District determined in Laird v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board that the dignitary interest of an
employee whose rehabilitation benefits were terminated favored a pre181
termination hearing. Without elaborating, the court stated, “[A]n
employee whose rehabilitation benefits are terminated by internal
administrative action without the opportunity to personally appear and
explain his rehabilitation efforts and needs surely loses at least a
182
modicum of dignity.”
California courts have also applied the Ramirez test in the context
of public schools. In Ryan, the court for the Fourth Appellate District
183
applied both the federal and state tests. The court found that the
student, who had sued the California Interscholastic Federation for
denying him eligibility to participate in after-school sports, did not have a
184
Similarly, the
constitutionally protected interest in that activity.
student’s ability to participate in a high school football program was not
185
a statutorily conferred benefit triggering due process under Ramirez.
Despite the absence of a trigger under either test, the court completed
the Ramirez analysis of the adequacy of the procedures already
186
provided. The court concluded that the procedures were sufficient and
stated simply that the dignitary interest under Ramirez was satisfied by
187
adequate notice to the parties.
One area where the courts particularly focus on the dignitary
interest is when an individual’s prior criminal conviction prevents or
denies her an opportunity to do something. For instance, in Gresher v.
Anderson, the plaintiff challenged the California Department of Social
Services’s procedures for exempting certain community care facility
employees from a ban against employing individuals with criminal
188
records. In that opinion, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate
District conducted a full analysis under Ramirez of the adequacy of the

179. Id. at 729–30 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 731 (“Indeed, it is doubtful whether appellants would have a due process claim under
the federal Constitution.”).
181. 195 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47–48 (Ct. App. 1983).
182. Id.
183. Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 805–20 (Ct. App. 2001).
184. Id. at 803–04, 810.
185. Id. at 817.
186. See id. at 817–18.
187. Id. at 820.
188. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 411 (Ct. App. 2005).
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procedures afforded by the agency. The agency’s protocol for notifying
community care facility workers that they needed an exemption from the
ban in order to be employed was to send a form letter “stating merely
that the [agency] had ‘received criminal history’ . . . from the Department
190
of Justice.” Without specifying the conviction, the form letter also
asked for an explanation of the conviction and informed the recipient
that they could get a copy of their criminal record from the Department
191
of Justice. The Gresher court strongly objected to this form of notice.
Relying on Ramirez to support the proposition that even where greater
procedure would not change the ultimate outcome, more procedure may
192
nonetheless be required to validate an individual’s dignitary interests,
the court reiterated that “[n]otice sufficient to enable a meaningful
193
response is an indispensable element of due process.” Due to the lack
of specificity in the notice, affected individuals were not provided with
sufficient information to make a meaningful response. The court stated
that “significant dignitary concerns are raised by a procedure in which
the state informs persons only that it has received unspecified ‘criminal
history’ about them and then requires a detailed explanation of each
194
conviction as a condition of considering an exemption request.”
Similarly, in Doe v. Saenz, different justices from the same appellate
district as in Gresher analyzed the procedures for notifying potential
employees at community care facilities that they could not apply for an
195
exemption from the ban because of the nature of their past convictions.
Under the statutory scheme, the Director of the Department of Social
Services “could grant a criminal record exemption for convictions of
certain crimes,” but had no discretion to grant exemptions for certain
196
When the
other, generally more violent, criminal convictions.
Department notified individuals that they would be ineligible for an
exemption, the notice contained no information about the nature of the
nonexempt offense, leaving the individual to seek information from the
197
198
Department of Justice. The court found Gresher to be controlling and
199
decided that due process was not satisfied. With respect to the dignitary
interest, the court stated, “A notice vaguely referring to a criminal
conviction that permanently bars an individual from working in

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 418–22.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id. at 421 (citing Ramirez).
Id.
Id.
45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126, 129–30 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149–50.
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community care facilities violates the dignitary interest one has in
understanding the nature, grounds, and consequences of governmental
200
action.” The concerns raised in Gresher were even graver in Saenz,
where inadequate notice was provided to individuals convicted of
201
offenses that the Department, in its discretion, deemed nonexemptible.
A notice reflecting a purely discretionary decision, and providing no
rationale or basis provided, is a clear example of an apparently arbitrary
agency decision. There is no meaningful opportunity to respond, because
there is no meaningful basis for a response. Thus, not only does this
procedure implicate the dignitary interest in being treated as a
responsible human being, but it also offends the touchstone of due
202
process.
Given that People v. Ramirez has been applied most often to cases
with similar underlying facts, namely, those in which a criminal
defendant is excluded from a government program, this may suggest that
Ramirez has been limited to its facts. Shortly after the Ramirez decision,
the Second Appellate District addressed the question of whether due
process required pre-exclusion procedures where the petitioner’s
application for work furlough status was denied on the basis of his prior
203
convictions for narcotics offenses. The court evaluated the procedures
204
due solely under Ramirez and conceptually linked the dignitary interest
that would be served by greater procedures to the risk of error inherent
205
in the existing procedures. Specifically, the court criticized the fact that,
prior to the interview for the work furlough status, the applicant had not
been informed of the criteria for approval or that “a potential ground for
206
exclusion existed.” Moreover, the applicant was never “informed of
207
why the nature of his conviction might exclude him from the program.”
Additionally, the applicant was not given the opportunity “to present
208
additional witnesses or documents to address the [agency’s] concerns.”
Greater procedural protections would not only have decreased the risk
of error in decisions to exclude, but would also have “serv[ed] the vital
dignity interest” by clearly demonstrating that the applicant continues to
209
be a valued member of society.

200.
201.
202.
1979).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 149.
Id.
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal.
In re Thomas, 206 Cal. Rptr. 719, 721–23 (Ct. App. 1984).
See id. at 723.
See id. at 725–26.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, the dignitary interest factor did not require a court to
permit an individual to represent himself when facing involuntary civil
210
commitment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. That statute
provided for the right to counsel; the “right to have access to relevant
medical and psychological reports and records; the right to retain experts
to perform an examination; the right to a probable cause hearing; [] the
211
right to a jury trial; and the right to be present at the hearing.” The
Sixth Appellate District decided that these procedures sufficiently
protected the applicant’s dignitary interest, and that due process did not
212
provide for a right to self-representation in those proceedings.
4.

The Impact of the Dignitary Interest Factor

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, while the trigger for due
process in California is, in fact, broader and more inclusive than the
federal trigger, the dignitary interest factor in testing what procedures
are due appears, thus far, to have little, if any, effect on the sufficiency of
procedural protections. Only a few courts have required enhanced
procedures: For example, the Ramirez court required an oral hearing, in
213
part to validate the dignitary interest. Likewise, in the community care
facility cases, courts required more specific and descriptive notice for
individuals affected by the ban on employing people with certain
criminal convictions. By contrast, many courts have required greater
procedural protections for reasons other than a dignitary interest. These
other factors, such as inadequate notice and insufficient response time,
have been more compelling in the balance of interests than a dignitary
interest in certain kinds of cases. For instance, the government’s actions
in the community care facilities cases carried a high risk of erroneous
214
deprivation. Although courts in those cases invoked the dignitary
interest factor, it is far from clear that they required greater procedure
based on that factor alone. The same can be said for the conservatorship
215
cases. There, the courts mentioned the Ramirez factors but ultimately
applied the federal due process framework and, in doing so, focused on
216
the high risk of erroneous deprivation in particular.
Even as compared to cases in other state courts with similar sets of
facts, the outcomes under the Ramirez balancing test appear to be no
different than under the federal test. For instance, in People v. Beckler,

210. People v. Fraser, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 437 (Ct. App. 2006). For California’s Sexually Violent
Predator Act, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 2008).
211. Fraser, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 437 (internal citations omitted).
212. Id.
213. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631–32.
214. E.g., Gresher v. Anderson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 419–20 (Ct. App. 2005).
215. E.g., Conservatorship of Tian L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 385–89 (Ct. App. 2007).
216. See id. at 388–89.
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the Illinois Supreme Court applied both the federal trigger and the
federal balancing test to conclude that the defendant had not been
217
afforded proper procedures. The defendant, who had previously
pleaded guilty to burglary, was placed in supervised rehabilitation for
218
treatment of a drug problem. He was subsequently deemed to be
unlikely to be rehabilitated and his participation in the program was
219
terminated without a hearing. The California Supreme Court reached
220
the same conclusion in Ramirez, applying the then-new test. Similarly,
in In re True, a civil commitment case, the Idaho Supreme Court used
the federal rationale and framework in holding that a mental health
patient was not afforded due process when her conditional release status
221
was revoked, as the patient was provided neither notice nor a hearing.
Given that the Idaho court reached this result under the federal test,
without the additional factor, the Ramirez court likely would also find
that the patient was not afforded due process—though its rationale
would likely focus on the dignitary interest of the mental health patient.
The Ramirez court criticized the Eldridge Court for glossing over
the fundamental tenets of due process—particularly the validation of an
individual’s dignity in the face of arbitrary exercises of state power—and
222
for creating a circular approach to due process. However, if “the [U.S.
Supreme] Court . . . fashioned an approach to assess[] the validity of
governmental action that . . . essentially drained due process of its basic
223
function as a limitation on the exercise of governmental power[,]” the
California Supreme Court did no better in its attempt to address those
due process values. The California high court’s focus on individual
dignity has not made the ad hoc application of due process analyses any
more coherent, or, more importantly, any more expansive or robust,
224
despite its promise to do so. California courts should seek to breathe
life into the state’s procedural due process doctrine in order to achieve
Ramirez’s initial promise. Thus, Part III proposes and evaluates a few
options for the California courts to adopt in order to preserve dignity in
due process.

III. New Directions for the California Courts
In light of the incoherent definition and application of the California
due process tests, California courts could pursue one of two paths: First,

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

459 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 673–74.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
645 P.2d 891, 894 (Idaho 1982).
See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. 1979).
Saphire, supra note 11, at 113.
See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27.
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the courts could abandon the dignitary interest in the balancing test;
second, courts could apply some force and meaning to the dignitary
interest factor. This Part addresses each avenue in turn. In the end,
giving force to the dignitary interest is not only more faithful to the
purpose and vision of Ramirez, but it also serves to protect individuals
from state action against which they would otherwise be defenseless.
A. Disregarding Dignity
Given the largely consistent application of the federal due process
test, the inconsistent application of the California test, and the similarity
of results under both tests, one could argue that attempting to breathe
life into the dignitary interest factor would be an exercise in futility.
However, in addition to contravening California Supreme Court
precedent, this argument is highly problematic in light of the precepts
underlying procedural due process.
One argument for disregarding the dignitary interest factor could be
that the California test already expands upon the federal threshold by
virtue of the more inclusive trigger, in spite of the confusion about its
225
parameters, and therefore by default, provides for greater procedural
protection. In that regard, the dignitary interest is simply an extra factor
with minimal impact on procedural sufficiency, because procedures are
so readily available once due process is triggered. This objection,
however, ignores the purpose of the dignitary interest: to affirm an
individual’s personhood vis-à-vis the state. Expansion of available
procedures may occur as a result of applying the factor, but that is not
the principally intended effect of the dignitary interest factor: guarding
individual rights from arbitrary actions by providing a person with the
226
chance to be heard by the individual responsible for her fate. The most
significant problem with this counterargument rests on the confusion
over when due process is actually triggered. Dismissing the confusion
over the trigger and ultimately relying on a poorly-defined test
significantly devalues principles of procedural due process, not to
mention rendering the availability of broader protections unpredictable.
Another argument may be that the dignitary interest can simply be,
and already is, subsumed under or recognized as part of one of the other
225. See discussion supra Part II.A.
226. In weighing what procedures ought to be added, courts consider the cost of adding such
protections to an agency’s adjudicatory process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976);
Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 628. For example, in Ramirez, the court required an oral hearing but did not
require the CRC to allow more formal hearing rights, such as confrontation and cross-examination.
599 P.2d at 631–32. Empirical data on the costs and benefits of applying the dignitary interest factor to
compel greater procedures might shed additional light on the utility of the factor. Indeed, allowing a
full, trial-like hearing may be prohibitively expensive in many cases, even so much as to outweigh the
benefits of acknowledging human dignity. Such an inquiry is outside the scope of this Note, which
addresses solely the focus that California’s due process inquiries ought to take.
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factors in the balancing test, such as the private interest or the risk of
erroneous deprivation. This also contradicts the California Supreme
Court’s intent and purpose when it expressly disapproved of the federal
227
rationale and attempted to reframe the balancing test. Indeed, in
Ramirez, the court specifically identified the importance of recognizing a
person as a responsible member of society and, hence, her inherent
228
dignity as one of the core values of due process. Subsuming the
dignitary interest under another factor fosters confusion amongst the
lower courts, disregards California precedent, and diminishes the value
of a person’s dignity when faced with administrative decisions.
Finally, one could argue that greater procedures than are
constitutionally required burden an already-overburdened administrative
state with little appreciable benefit for the private individual. However,
protecting individuals against arbitrary actions is, after all, the
229
touchstone of due process. This principle ought to tip the delicate
balance between efficiency and economy of government within the
administrative state on the one hand, and the protection of individuals
against state actions on the other, in favor of the individual. The state
should bear the burden of its actions against its citizens, even though
providing for more procedure would not necessarily result in a different
outcome.
B. Preserving Dignity
In short, California courts should give full meaning to the dignitary
interest factor. A test that is rarely applied fails to achieve the California
Supreme Court’s intended focus on acknowledging and protecting
dignity, and fails to recognize individuals as responsible and valued
members of society. When confronted with a heightened possibility of
arbitrary deprivation, an individual’s interest in maintaining her
personhood is of paramount importance. Thus, the test should be
redesigned to preserve dignity in due process. This could be achieved in
one of two ways: using the dignitary interest to require oral procedures,

227. Justice Mosk was known for his socially liberal perspective on the bench, see In Memoriam:
Honorable Stanley Mosk (1912–2001), Cal. Supreme Court Historical Soc’y, http://www.cschs.org/
02_history/images_c/02_c_mosk.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011), as well as for interpreting or basing
opinions on the state constitution rather than on the federal counterpart. Interview by Germaine
LaBerge with Stanley Mosk, Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, in S.F., Cal. 40–41 (Mar. 11, 1998), transcript
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/oral-history/pdf/mosk.pdf. His judicial philosophy was that
the state constitution is the governing body of law; consequently, he was “able to prevail on a number
of issues using . . . state law primarily.” Interview by Germaine LaBerge with Stanley Mosk, Justice,
supra, at 40. One such example is his position on limitations on an attorney’s right to exercise
peremptory challenges in jury selection. Id. at 40–41 (discussing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
228. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626.
229. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889).
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or rearticulating a new balancing test that prominently features the
dignitary interest.
First, the courts could interpret Ramirez as creating a presumption
that oral proceedings are required in administrative adjudications. This
of course interferes with the efficiency of the administrative state, but
that is not necessarily too high a price to pay for more respectful
government action. The most obvious argument is that oral proceedings,
because they would not increase the accuracy of an administrative
decision, while certainly increasing costs, are not always warranted. But,
a presumption favoring oral proceedings could be rebutted in cases
where such a procedure might be unduly burdensome—for example, in
drivers license determinations. And, accuracy is a cold counterpoint to
the simple act of being able to state one’s case and having the
opportunity to receive answers. For instance, in cases like Ramirez or the
civil commitment cases, oral proceedings affirm the individual’s dignitary
interest. The same would be true in cases with less dramatic facts, as
indicated by the Ramirez court’s statement that the dignitary interest
could, on occasion, command greater procedures—such as oral
proceedings—even though due process would have been otherwise
230
satisfied in a given case: “[W]hen the concern is with inherent values
231
[such as dignity], a right to oral participation seems essential.”
Although such holdings are rare, the best example would likely be
Ramirez itself, as the court required oral hearings in part to address the
232
dignitary concern.
If the Ramirez test is to operate as the balancing test for all due
process questions under the California analysis, then there are a number
of settings where greater procedures could be required, even though the
existing ones may be sufficient. Adverse employment decisions and
public education are two such contexts. For instance, a court could hold
that an employee who was fired or demoted by an agency must be
provided with a chance to respond orally to the reasons for the decision.
Doing so would affirm the employee’s status as a valued member of
society. A court could also require that a student or a teacher facing
school discipline have a chance to respond orally to the possibility of
disciplinary action. Such protection would not only afford greater
acknowledgement of the individual as a person, but would also enhance
the individual’s opportunity to be heard.
Second, the courts could more closely associate the dignitary
interest with one of the first two factors in the balancing test. In other
words, instead of subsuming the dignitary interest under either the

230. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27.
231. Saphire, supra, note 11, at 164.
232. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 631.
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private interest affected by the government action or the risk of
erroneous deprivation factors, the balancing test could be rearticulated
with the dignitary interest as one of three factors instead of one of four.
For instance, the dignitary interest could replace the private interest as
the first factor of the balancing test. Conceptually, this is possible
because the private interest at stake is often the same as the trigger—the
continued interest in employment or the benefit of being a patient at a
rehabilitation facility—and is often related to a person’s sense of being a
valued member of society. If the California Supreme Court had done so
in Ramirez, its discussion of the private interest factor would have
included not only a discussion of Ramirez’s interest in treatment, but also
his private, dignitary interest in being afforded an opportunity to respond
233
orally to the agency’s concerns about his status. His private interest in
being heard is comparable to his dignitary interest in being treated with
respect by the state.
The dignitary interest could also replace the second factor, risk of
error, as both relate to the accuracy and adequacy of the notice and
hearing procedures provided prior to the deprivation. At least one lower
court has done so, though perhaps not expressly. In Gresher v. Anderson,
the court discussed the problems with the existing due process
protections, focusing particularly on the quality of notice given to the
234
affected individual. Vague notice led to an inadequate opportunity to
235
respond. The court could also have framed its discussion of the high
risk of erroneous deprivation as offending the individual’s dignitary
interest. Put another way, the court could easily have argued that the
vague and inadequate notice failed to account fully for the individual’s
right to be treated and respected as a person—in addition to increasing
the risk of error in the action—without applying both factors separately
and independently. Either method of reforming the California balancing
test appears more likely to focus successfully on the dignitary interest of
the affected individual than the current method. Doing so would restore
the import of a person’s dignity in the due process analysis. Moreover, as
a three-factor test can be more facile in its application, changing the test
in one of these manners would have the added benefit of bringing some
coherence and legitimacy to California’s expansive due process
approach.

233. See id.
234. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 421 (Ct. App. 2005).
235. Id. at 421–22; see also Doe v. Saenz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126, 148–49 (Ct. App. 2006); In re
Thomas, 206 Cal. Rptr. 719, 725–26 (Ct. App. 1984).
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Conclusion
Ensuring that due process is afforded to individuals who are
subjected to adverse state action is especially difficult in the
administrative context. Administrative agencies were created to delegate
governing responsibility to another, albeit associated, branch of the
government in the name of efficiency. Despite the benefits of such a
system—and there are many—the risks to the individuals who rely on
that system are great, because agencies are not fully democratically
accountable. Due process, therefore, is especially important in the
administrative context, because the chance of arbitrary state action
increases as government agencies become less accountable. In balancing
the purposes of due process and the needs of a modern administrative
state, federal and California courts have reached two different
conclusions on the scope and protection of due process. Although the
California approach purports to be more inclusive, it is only partially so.
While the trigger for procedural protections is more sensitive, it is also
confounding. California appellate courts have struggled to interpret the
Ramirez trigger for procedural due process. At least three different
interpretations are viable, and though courts appear to apply one more
commonly than the others, the ease with which courts reach these
different interpretations raises significant concerns about whether
fundamental precepts of due process—namely, dignity—are being
fulfilled. Likewise, the test for determining procedural sufficiency
acknowledges an individual’s personhood in a cursory fashion, if at all,
because the high court has failed to delineate clearly the parameters and
application of Ramirez. Given the risks of being subject to arbitrary state
action in administrative contexts, the California Supreme Court’s
attempt to focus the state test on a person’s dignity is valuable and ought
to be pursued. One such way to accomplish this is to interpret Ramirez,
the seminal case, as creating a presumption in favor of oral proceedings.
Another, perhaps more effective, way would be to rearticulate the test
with the dignitary factor as one of three factors instead of as a lost factor
in a set of four. Either solution would enhance the coherence of the
California due process test without disregarding either the state’s highest
court or the dignitary interest of its residents.

